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Works Councils and Employment Growth:
A Rejoinder to Uwe Jirjahn’s Critique**
Abstract – In a characteristically combative treatment, Jirjahn (2008a) argues that Addison and 
Teixeira’s (2006) finding of a negative relationship between works council presence and em-
ployment growth is a chimera produced by the way in which establishment size is measured. 
We reject his assertion of misspecification for two reasons; the second of which undoubtedly 
contributed to leading Jirjahn astray. And while Jirjahn’s treatment is of interest in its own 
right, he does a poor job of portraying our overall analysis. Thus, he neglects our treatment of 
survival bias while ignoring our presentation of a dynamic labor demand model. Elsewhere he 
seems to grudgingly support the former (Jirjahn 2008b), and implicitly to accept our findings 
pertaining to employment adjustment (where we report that works councils do not slow the 
tortuous pace of employment adjustment in Germany). At root, the thrust of his treatment is 
adversarial and his position on the economic effects of works councils over-optimistic. But the 
main lesson of Jirjahn’s critique is that more work is required of all of us in this area. Issues 
raised by the present exchange, apart from the need for a wider set of covariates and longer 
time frame, include the selection of firms into collective bargaining and works councils and out
of the system, and the consequences for the raw point estimates. Pending this work, it would be 
idle to overstate the robustness of the extant results. We hinted at this in our own treatment in 
comparing cross-sectional results with dynamic panel estimates.  
Betriebsräte und Beschäftigungswachstum:  
Eine Antwort auf Uwe Jirjahns Kritik 
Zusammenfassung – Jirjahn (2008a) argumentiert, dass der Befund von Addison und Teixera 
(2006), nach dem ein negativer Zusammenhangs zwischen der Existenz von Betriebsräten und 
dem Beschäftigungswachstum vorliege, ein methodisches Artefakt sei, welches aus der Art der 
Messung der Betriebsgröße resultiere. Wir widersprechen dieser These mit zwei zentralen 
Argumenten. Obwohl Jirjahns Argumentation für sich genommen interessant ist, spiegelt sie 
unsere Analyse insgesamt nicht vollständig wider, weil unsere Behandlung des „survival bias“ 
vernachlässigt und unsere Präsentation eines dynamischen Arbeitsnachfragemodells nicht zur 
Kenntnis genommen wird.  Die Hauptbotschaft von Jirjahns Kritik ist, dass mehr Forschung 
notwendig ist, u.a. mit mehr Kontrollvariablen, längeren Zeithorizonten und zur Selektion der 
Unternehmen, in denen ein Betriebsrat gegründet oder wiederabgeschafft wird. Bis hierzu 
weitere Ergebnisse vorliegen, muss die Robustheit der schon vorliegenden Ergebnisse vorsich-
tig bewertet werden.      
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1. Introduction 
The effect of worker representation on employment growth has long been examined 
in the Anglo-Saxon literature. Contrary to their effect on some other indicators of 
firm performance, there has been comparatively little disputation over the effect of 
unions on employment. Thus, the British (Blanchflower/Millward/Oswald 1991; 
Booth/McCulloch 1999; Bryson 2004a; Addison/Belfield 2004), Australian (Wooden/ 
Hawke 2000), and U.S. (Leonard 1992) evidence all points to reduced employment 
growth under unionism.1 Indeed, one can go further: the literature suggests that un-
ionized establishments tend to grow by around 3 percent less per year than similar 
unorganized plants. In other words, a near common result obtains holding constant 
the concentration of unions in declining industries and older workplaces, inter al.  
Now works councils are not unions. Formally at least works councils do not bar-
gain over wages, while the (offsetting) efficiency or voice arguments often made for 
unionism are theoretically stronger in the case of works councils. In sum, we should 
not necessarily expect to observe similar effects at workplace level of worker represen-
tation: workplace unions in the Anglo-Saxon case and works councils in the German 
case. And if Bryson’s (2004a) findings with respect to the important contributory role 
of bargaining power to the employment change outcome are correct, then we might 
expect very different results for German works councils than for their Anglo-Saxon 
‘counterparts’ in favor of the former.  
This, then, is the wider backdrop to the inquiry by Addison and Teixeira (2006) 
into the effects of works councils on employment change, the direct motivation being 
the virtual absence of any comprehensive German study on the works council-
employment nexus other than (disputation as to their implications for) labor turnover 
(e.g. Kraft 1986; Frick 1996; see also Frick/Möller 2003;Kraft 2006). In the light of 
what follows, we would also emphasize that our study proceeded several steps beyond 
a simple analysis of employment change to incorporate allowance for survival bias 
while also presenting a dynamic labor demand model charting works council effects 
on the speed of employment adjustment and, now less centrally, on employment 
growth.
The paper by Jirjahn (2008a) focuses solely on the specification of the simple 
employment change model and ignores (here at least) those other aspects of our 
treatment. His principal conclusion is that our test procedures are flawed because of 
the misspecification of the employment size regressor. And from the outset, he nails 
                                                          
1  Admittedly, some minor controversy was occasioned in the early British literature by 
Machin and Wadhwani’s (1991) claim that union plants were at this time more likely to be 
shedding labor on efficiency grounds. Their argument was that unionized firms in the 
early-to-mid 1980s were more likely to see an erosion of restrictive practices (allied to 
overmanning practices and demarcation). But Booth and McCulloch (1999) were later to 
report that the union effect on employment was indeed robust to the inclusion of organ-
izational change measures. That said, while rebutting the Machin-Wadhwani challenge, 
this debate alerts us to the important consideration that employment effects are not an 
unambiguous measure of performance and have to be viewed alongside the totality of un-
ion effects on economic outcomes. 
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his flag to the mast. First of all, he appears to be astonished that one can obtain such 
negative results on the basis of the wider works council literature that points to “neu-
tral-to-positive effects of codetermination on economic outcomes” (he is presumably 
referring to workplace codetermination rather than board membership; otherwise, we 
feel entitled to claim that he would find the extant financial empirical literature even 
harder to bear [e.g. Gorton/Schmid 2004]). Subject to the caveat that employment 
growth is an elusive measure of efficiency, we think this reading of the wider evidence 
is a tad partisan (for a survey, see Addison/Schnabel/Wagner 2004). Second of all, he 
concludes with some results of an unpublished study of his (Jirjahn 2008b) to the 
effect that works councils actually increase employment once one allows for the en-
dogeneity of the institution. Frankly, most observers will view this as a more astonish-
ing claim. Less adversarially put, it is incumbent upon him to establish the point using 
the present dataset or at least to emphasize that the results are from a study covering a 
different dataset, a different sector (manufacturing) and time interval (1994-1997), and 
to acknowledge the well-known difficulty of accounting for the endogeneity of the 
institution which is accentuated in this temporal frame. 
2. The misspecification charge 
Jirjahn’s basic criticism is that our finding of a negative relationship between works 
council presence and employment growth is a chimera produced by the way in which 
we measure establishment (employment) size. To illustrate he runs three employment 
growth regressions each of which contains a variant of establishment size (fashioned 
from level of base-year employment). In the first, establishment size is measured line-
arly; in the second, it enters as a quadratic; and in the third it assumes a proportional 
logarithmic form. For the first two equations the coefficient estimate for the works 
council dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
But in the third equation although the coefficient estimate retains its negative sign it 
fails to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, this selfsame pattern is repeated for 
different representations of the data (plants in which works council status – either 
presence or absence – was unchanged over the entire sample period, and plants with 
between 21 and 100 employees) and the dependent variable (with growth measured as 
the difference in log employment rather than absolute employment change divided by 
one half the sum of employment at beginning and end of period). 
However, to argue that our result is the result of specification error on this ac-
count would seem to rest on some pretty strong assumptions. Apart from the fact that 
like is not strictly being compared with like, this accusation would seem to rest on the 
notion that Gibrat’s law is contraindicated. Now while mean reversion might seem to 
be suggested by Jirjahn’s finding of a statistically significant negative coefficient esti-
mate for ln employment size the fact of the matter is that his employment change 
equation  is not a test of Gibrat’s law (any more than our own). A proper test would 
presumably use panel unit root tests and not just an employment change equation (see 
for example, Harris/Trainor 2005). To repeat, the employment growth equations used 
in the two studies do not constitute a test of the principle that each firm faces the 
same distribution of growth possibilities so that growth follows a random walk – on 
the rejection of which Jirjahn’s charge of misspecification ultimately rests  
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What does the German evidence on employment change actually suggest in this re-
gard?  It does not appear to indicate that the relation between firm size and firm 
growth is decreasing in employment size. Thus, for example, in an early study using 
manufacturing establishment data for Lower Saxony, 1978-89, Wagner (1992) reports 
that there is no indication that smaller manufacturing firms grew systematically faster 
or slower than their larger counterparts over the sample period, even if there were 
some signs of ‘persistence of chance’ in the data. Lest it be thought that these results 
are peculiar to this Land and sector, Wagner et al. (2008) reach a broadly similar con-
clusion using nationally representative data for the industrial and service sectors, 1999-
2005. Specifically, they conclude that there is little to support the popular notion that 
small and middle-sized enterprises serve as the ‘job-motor’ of the economy.  
At this point, we have to admit to an error of omission on our side that escaped 
identification in the proof-reading stage: our establishment size proxy was in fact mea-
sured in logarithmic form. Jirjahn was not to know this and we commend him for 
experimenting with several variants of establishment size based on employment. That 
said, if we led him astray we would nonetheless contend from the general tenor of his 
response that he was eager to be led.  
3. Housekeeping 
We next deal with some points of housekeeping before turning to examine those parts 
of our analysis conspicuously ignored by Jirjahn. Let us start with questions having to 
do with sample size before turning to the covariates, even if the two issues are related. 
Jirjahn’s first set of estimates are for plants on which he has the necessary employment
data at beginning and end of period. As far as works council status is concerned, he is 
at this stage only interested in beginning-of-period values. (For our part, we were con-
cerned to have these data on firms for all years given our subsequent analysis of an-
nual employment changes; see section 5 below).2 As a result there are some major 
sample differences between our two studies: 906 in the case of Jirjahn’s initial sample 
(see his Table 2) and 600 in our case. To be sure, Jirjahn next presents results (his 
Table 3) for plants that had the same works council status at beginning and end of 
period as a result of which his sample falls by 22.2 percent to 705 establishments. As 
he notes, this difference is considerably larger than the number of changes in works 
council status. Although his main finding is undisturbed by this precipitous drop in 
sample size, the basic point is that the size of our two samples differ. Sample sizes can 
matter a lot because of differences in their composition. Note that employment 
growth rates differ markedly for our two samples: -5.5 percent for Addison and Tei-
xeira and -18 percent for Jirjahn.  
Sample size also differs because of (missing data associated with) differences in 
variables. We do not wish to nickel and dime Jirjahn on his choice of variables, some 
of which we find rather compelling. He eschews our choice of regressors largely on 
the grounds that they proved insignificant – as indeed might his for a different sample 
– but he pauses long enough to take a swipe at our use of an average wage argument. 
He reasons that it is endogenous and likely to be a function of works council influ-
                                                          
2  Though we excised the small number of firms who changed their works council status. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 15. Jg., Heft 4, 2008   431 
ence. Although we intended the variable to reflect general insider power, and were 
aiming at consistency with our dynamic labor demand analysis, we take his point. As a 
check, did he substitute the wage variable for the works council dummy in any specifi-
cations?
Finally, Jirjahn criticizes our exclusion of agriculture and forestry, hunting and 
fishing on the one hand and banking and insurance on the other. To mix metaphors, 
this seems more a case of carping. It is fairly conventional to exclude agriculture etc. 
since most of these sectors are populated by family businesses, with obvious implica-
tions for works council formation. We exclude banking and finance because of differ-
ences in output measures: output in the form of sales is required for the second part 
of the paper dealing with dynamic labor demand and we wanted to maintain consis-
tency between the two parts of the paper. This leaves the question of our use of five 
industry dummies; Jirjahn uses nine (as well as nine dummies for the old Federal 
states/city states). We were more parsimonious to sidestep problems raised by chan-
ges in industry classification. 
The bottom line for us is that since our two samples differ considerably we are 
not necessarily surprised that Jirjahn comes up with different results for the principal 
variable of interest. The more surprisingly result is perhaps that the influence of the 
work council is so well determined in specifications using establishment size in linear 
or quadratic form. Intrinsically we see little to criticize in Jirjahn’s choice of variables. 
But it is perhaps no accident that antagonists in the early British debate over the role 
of unions in retarding employment growth pursued that debate using very different 
specifications.  
4. Survival bias 
An important part of the Addison and Teixeira (2006) paper was an analysis of sur-
vival bias. There is no mention of this in Jirjahn’s critique. His treatment is based ex-
clusively on a sample of surviving establishments. As is well known, this raises a po-
tential selection issue. If works councils increase the probability of workplace closure, 
any negative impact that they are found to have on employment growth may be un-
derstated. How sensitive are his results to this problem?  We are not told. 
It was long thought in the Anglo-Saxon literature that although union rent seek-
ing might well limit employment growth, unions would not push firms over the edge 
(e.g. Freeman/Kleiner 1999: 512). The early British literature using the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey seemed to confirm this prediction: there was no indication 
that either union bargaining presence or the predicted mean union wage differential 
influenced plant closures (Machin 1995; Stewart 1995).The more recent evidence 
points in a quite different direction: the sign of the coefficient estimate using the 1998 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey is both positive and well determined. But 
there is no simple explanation for this sea change in union effect given that union 
power was in decline over the interval covered by the two sets of studies.3
                                                          
3  Bryson (2004b) now contends that the reduction in union bargaining power was respon-
sible for the worsened outcome. His argument is that unions have to be strong to be an 
effective vehicle of pro-productive voice and to act as an authoritative agent of the em-
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Given this body of evidence, Addison and Teixeira (2006) offer two tests of sur-
vival bias. On balance, they conclude that failing to account for plant closings most 
probably does not lead to an understatement of the negative effect of works councils 
on employment change. We are surprised that Jirjahn did not attempt a similar set of 
tests for potential survivor bias. Elsewhere at least he seems content to rely on the 
results of our test procedures (Jirjahn 2008b: 22). 
5. The tortuous path of employment adjustment in Germany  
In the final part of our paper we discussed another aspect of works council potential 
influence. We estimated a dynamic labor demand model to determine whether the 
process of labor demand adjustment at micro level is sensitive to the presence of the 
institution. In short, do works councils impact employment inertia? To this end we 
exploited the panel nature of the data set and no longer just two cross sections of 
data. (Note, too, that as a secondary output our estimating equation allows us to re-
coup the effect of works councils on employment growth by interacting the works 
council dummy with a time trend.) Since Jirjahn does not inform the reader, what do 
we find? First, we report that works councils seemingly do not exacerbate the already 
tortuous path of employment adjustment in Germany. They do not, then, actually add 
to the sluggishness of the employment adjustment process. This is a nontrivial result 
given the powers of the works council in the area of dismissals and manpower ad-
justment more generally. Second, although negatively signed, the coefficient estimate 
for the interaction between the works council dummy and the time trend is not statis-
tically significant. On this measure, then, works council do not materially effect any 
trend growth in employment, even though we would (and did) argue that the issue of 
the growth differential between works council plants and non works council plants is 
best tackled using a wider change interval than is permitted by this short panel.  
6. Concluding remarks 
In his article on works councils and employment growth, Jirjahn (2008a) uses our 
paper as a something of a whipping boy to make the case that works councils do not 
act as a ‘brake’ on employment, a result which he finds in accord with the wider litera-
ture on the economic effects of works councils. We argue to the contrary that the 
thrust of his particular criticism is wide of the mark and that he unreservedly views 
works councils through rose-tinted lenses. We were no less concerned that he inade-
quately represents our overall analysis. 
                                                          
ployer principal. Vulgo: the Thatcher legislation so weakened unions that they could nei-
ther deliver voice nor police the worker side.  For their part, Addison, Heywood, and Wei 
(2003) report that the positive effect on plant closings only holds for establishments that 
are part of multi-establishment undertakings. In these cases, the decline in union power 
likely emboldened employers to close unprofitable units. Unions, so the argument goes, 
had hitherto kept open unprofitable plants by threatening to strike profitable ones. The 
new need to ballot members under Tory legislation destroyed the credibility of this 
mechanism because workers whose jobs were not in danger jeopardy would not vote for a 
strike.
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The accusation of misspecification requires a refutation of Gibrat’s law. Jirjahn 
nowhere provides the requisite evidence on mean reversion, while the admittedly 
sparse German literature if anything might suggest that firm growth rates are independ-
ent of firm size. This does not mean that Jirjahn’s own works council result is flawed, 
merely that it is not right and ours wrong for the reason he gives: misspecification.   
Our charge of partiality rests in part on Jirjahn’s interpretation of the wider evi-
dence and more substantially on his failure to consider the important components of 
our paper examining whether the presence of survival bias understates any negative 
effect of works councils on growth and whether works council presence slows the 
process of employment adjustment in Germany. Let us remind the reader that we 
detected few signs of survival bias in the data and even less indication that works 
councils slowed the process of employment adjustment. We even noted – subject to 
caveats – that dynamic employment equations do not support the finding in the first 
half of our paper that works councils retard employment growth. Jirjahn totally ne-
glects these aspects of our paper in what is clearly an adversarial treatment. 
He does however react to material in our paper that at first blush at least gores 
one of his oxen: unfavourable works council effects on employment that are if any-
thing seemingly slightly amplified in the presence of collective bargaining proper. This 
runs counter of course to the argument in Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) that any works 
council rent seeking should be more contained under (industry-wide) collective bar-
gaining with the implication that any negative employment effects should be mitigated 
in such circumstances. We made light of our result in our paper, consigning the results 
to the appendices. Specifically, we discounted the marginally significant estimates in 
ultimately concluding more ecumenically that the employment effects of works coun-
cils were likely invariant with respect to collective bargaining regime. Much more at-
tention is required on the works council-collective agreement nexus than we were able 
to give it, not least because of (the ability to exploit) changes in collective bargaining 
status. Why did Jirjahn himself not exploit the collective bargaining question in the 
dataset? Was it because the 1993 questionnaire does not contain this information, as 
he correctly if acidly observes. Perhaps. In any event, let us assure him that we did not 
rely on interpolation and that the sample period of the appendix regressions in ques-
tion is 1995-2001 rather than 1993-2001.4
We end with one such criticism of our own. In his very concluding remark, Jir-
jahn reminds us that the key variable of interest – works council presence or otherwise 
– is itself endogenous. He argues that once one allows for the fact that works councils 
are seemingly established by the workforce to protect its interests when the establish-
ment is in extremis, the effect on employment is in fact significantly positive! But can 
this result be generalized to the IAB Establishment Panel, when it is based on regres-
sions using three years of employment change data from one Land and the manufac-
turing sector alone (Jirjahn 2008b)? In fact, it is notoriously difficult to endogenize 
                                                          
4  We might also note that the sample sizes in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 were incorrectly 
stated. In Table A1 they should have read: 221, 221, 1,075 and 1,075 (rather than 232, 
232, 1,105, and 1,105). Similarly, the correct number of observations in columns (1) and 
(4) of Table A2 is 138 and 581 (not 143 and 600). 
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works councils – principally because so few establishments change their status 
through time.5 This does not mean that one should not try to correct for this form of 
selection but, rather, be very careful in drawing inferences about net works council 
effects based on particular (IV) estimates that ignore other forms of selection into and 
out of the system. 
We did our best to offer a well rounded study of the effects of works councils 
upon employment change and adjustment. We see the need to improve our analysis 
along a number of dimensions including new covariates (including some of those 
suggested by Jirjahn and other subsequent studies including our own) and exploiting 
the longer time periods now available with the evolution of the IAB Establishment 
Panel. We remain open to the possibility that our point estimates may not be robust to 
time period, sample, and control for selection. So, too, should Jirjahn. He might use-
fully be reminded of the old Anglo-(if not Nieder-) Saxon adage: people who live in 
glass houses shouldn’t throw [too many] stones. Or, if we might adapt a German say-
ing: one revisits every equation at least once. 
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